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Abstract:  What explains the spectaeutar increases in inequality of disposable income in transitional 
economies of Central and Eastern Europe? There are at least two possible explanations. First, the 
pre-tax distribution of incoine became more unequal because of the shift to a market economy. 
Second, the degree of progressivity of the income tax system declined. But each of these factors is 
in turn determined by other structural changes associated with transition-notably,  the decrease in 
public provision of key public goods, the decrease in non income tax revenue sources such as profits 
from public production, and perhaps a decline in society's inequality aversion. This paper develops 
a fi-ameu~ork  in which these different forces on inequality can be assessed. Using a simple two-type 
and two-sector optimal income tax model with endogenous wages, we first of all show that a 
decrease in the provision of public goods could indeed lead to increasing "inherent"  inequality, 
in  other words inequalip in  market incomes. It then deploys the lvli~lees  model of optimal non- 
linear tasation to assess the relative impacts of rhis increase in  inherent inequaiity. the decreasing 
sources of non income tax revenue. and possible declines in inequality aversion; to get a 
numerical feel for their possible impacts on ineqriallty 1.  Introduction 
Tax:transfer system reform was central to the transition process from the centrally 
planned economy to a market-type economy in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE).  In the old 
fiscal system a large share of tax revenue came directly or indirectly from state-owned firms. The 
new fiscal system is in turn designed to be compatible with future El! membership of CEE 
countries.  A personal income tax, a value added tax and entrepreneurial profits tax are all largely 
modelled on western counterparts. The introduction of the new fiscal system, in concert with 
other struch~ral  feah~e  of the transition, has had profound indirect and direct distributional 
effects.  One common characteristic of the transition in Central and Eastern Europe has been an 
increase in income inequality.  Both market and disposable income inequality has risen in these 
countries during the 1990s.  Driving this increase in inequality have been a variety of factors.  In 
the pre reform situation the requirement of government expenditure was largely met from non- 
tax revenue as the profits of public production, taxation of enterprise profits and commodity 
transactions.  Privatisation of state owned firms surely has had significant consequences for 
income inequality.  Other factors such as trade liberalization, changes to the level and 
composition of government spending including declines in the provision of public goods, and 
changes in the wage setting process, have all tended to raise inequality.  At the same time, it can 
be argued that these societies havc become less averse per se to inequality1. 
This paper develops a tkamework in which these different forces on inequality can be 
assessed. We start by surveying the salient empirical facts on income inequality and 
redistribution based on the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) database in Section 2.  In Section 3 
we indicate the potentially important channels for changes in market income inequality, or 
"inherent" inequality, using a simple two-type and two-sector optimal income tax model with 
endogenous wages.  We argue that a reduction in public goods provision can indeed lead to an 
increase in inherent inequality in such models.  Section 4 accepts an increase in inherent 
inequality but looks at optimal redistribution in the face of this increase. and also when sources 
of non income tax revenue disappear as the structure changes, and as aversion to inequality fails 
Iciording to Atkinson 2nd \iiick:cririph!  (1902)  CEE counriics nere daring the  19:Os  arid 1980s iery egaiirari,~n 
in their disposable income distribiiiion compared with comprnb!c wcstcrii rrarket econimnics. -  ail forces that, it can be argued, have been present tn the transttlon process  Sectton 5 concludes 
the paper wtth a disct~ss~on  of d~rect~ons  for further research 
2.  The Basic Facts 
This section sets the stage by reviewing empirical findings on income inequality and the 
extent of redistribution in the tmnsition countries.  Data on income distribution shown in Table 
2.1 and 2.2 are obtained from the LSS.  The relatively high quality of this data source has been 
commented on elsewhere (see Atkinson-Brandolini, 2001).  The income concepts employed are 
market income (MI), pension transfers (P) added to market income (MS+P) and disposable 
income (Dl),  with household size being allowed for  by deflating by the square root of the 
nutnber of household members. 
Table 2.1 provides estimates of the change in the disposable income distribution. in the 
period considered, the Gini-coefficient of disposable income rose markedly, as did the various 
decile ratios.  Table 2.2 shows that the inequality of market incomes also rose markedly, a factor 
confirmed by Table 2.3 which shows significant increases in the decile ratios of the gross 
earnings of employees. However, interestingly, Table 2.2 shows that the extent of redistribution, 
as measured by the difference in the increase of market income inequality and the increase of 
disposable income inequality, actually increased.  For example, between 1986 and 1995 in 
Poland the Gini coefficient for market income increased by over 20 percentage points. But the 
disposable income Gini only rose by  around 10 points.  Thus on one measure, the extent of 
redistribution increased by more than 10 percentage points. 
These facts set up our basic analytical questions.  What explains the increase in market 
inequality?  Given this increase. what explains the increased degree of redistribution especially 
if*  as is often argued, the degree of inequality aversion also fell during the transition period?  The 
next two sections take LIP these questions. Table 2.1 
Income (disposable) inequality measures 
Country  Year  Gini-  Percentile  Percentile  Percentile 
coefficient  Ratio(90; 10)  Ratio(90150)  Ratio(80i20) 
Czech-  1992  0.207  2.37  1.55  1.73 
Republic  1996  0.259  3.01  1.79  2.04 
Hungary  1991  0.283  3.39  1.82  2.18 
1994  0.323  4.19  2.09  2.42 
Poland  1986  0.271  3.51  1.77  2.32 
1992  0.274  3.42  1.84  2.17 
1995  0.318  4.04  1.89  2.37 
Russia  1992  0.393  6.66  2.40  3.45 
1995  0.447  9.39  2.82  3.95 
Slovak  1992  0.189  2.25  1.49  1.68 
Republic 
Table 2.2 
Gini coefficients and redistribution in transition economies 
Country  Year  Gini-  G*~~  Gini-  RD=Gini(hli) 
coefficient(M1)  coefficient(MI+P)  cocfficient(D1)  -Gini(DI) 
Czech-  1992  43.7  30.0  21.7  -22.0 
Republic 
Hungary  1991  52.0  39.2  30.3  -21.7 
Poland  1986  39.9  33.5  29.1  -10.8 
1992  45.9  36.3  33.8  -12.7 
1995  60.6  50.9  38.8  -21.7 
Russia  1992  56  47.2  45.2  -10.8 
1995  62  50.0  48.8  -13.2 
Slo~ak  1992  33.0  32.0  20.9  -22.1 
Kepitblic 
Soiirce: Milanosic (2000)  bascd on !-IS  data. Table 2.3 
Distribution of gross earnings of empioyees(P90/PlO) 
Country  1989  I990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997 
Czech-republic  2.43  2.60  2.75  3.20  3.14  3.70  2.86  2.98 
Hungary  3.40  3.56  3.70  3.75  4.17 
Poland  2.43  2.85  2.91  3.01  3.40  3.35  3.48  3.53 
Russia  3.33  3.36  4.28  8.17  15.55  9.41  9.96  9.60  10.40 
Ukraine  3.12  5.51  5.74  5.74 
Source: Flemming-Micklewright  (2000), Appendix B 
3.  Public Provision and Market Inequality 
Consider the following model, a modified version of the model in Naito (1999). There are 
two types of workers in the economy: Workers of type I  are less skilled and earn income  w,  . 
The more skilled workers, type 2, earn a wage  vv2 (> tv, ).  The number of workers of each type is 
1. Workers supply labour, denoted by  I, and consume two types of goods: a normal private good, 
x, and a quasi-private good g, The latter good is provided by the state sector. Preferences are 
represented by a strictly monotone, strictly quasiconcave, and twice differentiable utility function 
by  v(x,  ,I:, g)  . Urorkers rnaximise v(x,l, g) with respect to his or her labour supply, subject to a 
given tax schedulel T(yl,  and the budget constraint  x  =  y -  Tfy),  where  y = wl denotes workers 
gross income. 
The good x is produced in the private sector according to an aggregate. constant returns 
to scale, production function  H(l;  .I:  ) ,  where  I,'  and  1'  denote the labour inputs in the pnvate 
sector.  The good g in turn is produced according to the aggregate production function  G(If  1;) , 
whcre  1'  and  1"  are the labour inputs in the public sector.  Sote that the same technology is 
~ised  to produce both goods.  They have thus si~nilar  producer prices as well.  For simplicity, the 
priccs for both gor>ds arc normalised to tiiiity.  This spccificatio~l  captures two impoi-tai~t  features 
of thc model.  First, the wage ratcs are endogenous in  a similar way as in Stem (1982) or Stigiitz 1V 
(1982).  In the following,  .Q =  depicts the relative wage of the low-skilled type.  Assuming a 
M'2 
\L\ 
competitive labour market, .Q  is a function of i,  il, , -  =  .  It captures the idea that 
Wr  ff2  (l,,  1: ) 
the relative wage rate of type 1, determined at the market, is a decreasing function of 1, ;  1, . It is 
also assumed that the public sector minimizes costs with respect to the wages rl  and r2 
by the govemment.  Thus the public sector minimizes production costs by equating the marginal 
rate of transformation between unskilled and skilled workers to the ratio of equilibrium wage 
r,  G,(~,>4,)  rates, i.e. -  = 
r,  G2  (1, -4) 
Following the standard idea of Pareto-optimal taxation, the govemment maximises the 
utility of the less-skilled workers subject to the constraint that the skilled worker must stay at a 
given utility level. The government redistributes income by taxing income on a non-linear scale. 
It may also use a unifosm public provision of g as a policy variable.  We apply the infosmation- 
based approach to tax policy by assuming that the government can observe the labour income y7 
but it does not observe the income earning abilities (the wage rates) of the workers. Therefore, 
the govemment must select the tax schedule subject to the self-selection constraint that the 
skilled worker has an incentive to work 1:  =yz iwz, report income yz and consume xz  instead of 
wishing to pretend to be the unskilled household, i.e. mimic, working  y,  /w2  =w,l,/+v2  =GI,, 
reporting income yl, and consuming .Y  I.  The govemment chooses the optimal tax schedule (or 
labour -- after-tax income) bundles to the hvo different worker types subject to the constraint that 
the skilled worker be at a given utility level, the self-selection constraint of the skilled worker, 
and the resource constraint of the economy.  We concentrate here on the 'nonnal' case where the 
redistribution occurs from the skilled workers to the unskilled ones.  Thus the self-selection 
constraint of the skilled workers is binding.  The Lagrangean of  the government optimisation 
problenl can therefore be written as The first-order conditions are the following: 
.v'-$-p  =o 
1.r 
where the hat terms refer to the so-called mimickers, i.c. type 2 workers when mimicking the 
choice of  type 1 
Suppose that the government has chosen to produce a certain amount of consumption, g. 
Given this; suppose further that the go~emmenr's  income tax and public employment policy is 
optirnal.  lye will now show that the marginal rate of transformation between these two types of 
I:  iv 
labour in pttblic prodi~ction  is smaller than that one in the private sector, i.e -  < --.  From the 
I;  IL. 
equation (61 we see that only in the case that the second term is zero the production efficiency holds it.,  GI/G2  =HI.IH2  . But we also note that the term -  &:1,  is positive.  Thus the Diamond- 
Mirrlees efficiency theorem does not hold in this model.  Given our assumptions about the public 
production function (6) implies the following results; to produce a given amount of consumption 
the government should employ more unskilled workers and less skilled workers than is necessary 
to minimize cost at the prevailing gross wage rates.  This means that if the supply of low skilled 
workers becomes scarcer in the private sector, through hiring more of these workers into the 
public sector, this reduces the wage differentials of the workers. Thus, indirect redistribution 
through public sector employment will Pareto-improve welfare by mitigating the incentive 
problem of the non-linear income tax system. Or put it in terms of envelope arguments. If in the 
beginning the production efficiency holds, then the marginal change in hiring more low skilled 
workers to the public sector has no first order welfare costs.  It affects only relative wages of the 
low skilled workers. 
Given the optimal income tax and employment policy, we may also use the envelope 
argument to detect the change in the social welfare from an increase in the level of the publicly 
provided good as follows: 
Our focus is, however, more in the production side of the economy>  and therefore we concentrate 
on the case with the %-eakly  separable (between consutnption and labour (or leisure)) utility 
function. Rewriting (8) by substih~ting  for  px  froin (2) and (4) yields 
What is interesting in  (9) is the link between the publicly provided private good and the wage 
>> (in 
structure of the econotny (the term -  p;  -1,  ).  If its provision leads to a relative increase in 
cig 
the wagc rate for type 1 L\-orkers.  then indirect redistribution through public provision will 
Pareto-iinprovc weifarc by mitigating the incentive problcrn of the non-linear incoine tax system. These results bear resemblance to the interesting recent findings by Naito (1999) that if 
wage rates are endogenous: redistribution devices that othenvise would not be applied -  in 
Naito's case public inputs and commodity taxation and in our case public sector employment 
combined with public provision of private goods -- become welfare-improving.  These theoretical 
results support the view that the privatisation and a decrease in public provision such as 
education, health care and social services may have been important factors in explaining 
increasing inherent inequality in transition economies during the 1990s. 
4.  Optimal Non-linear Redistribution 
An analytical framework for thinking through the relationship between inherent 
inequality and the extent of redistribution is put forward by James Minlees in his Nobel Prize 
winning paper (Minlees, 1971).  It captures the central features in thinking about the evolution 
of redistribution policy,  Certain key elements of the Mirrlees model are useful for our purposes. 
First is the concept of inherent inequality reflecting among other things skilled :unskilled wage 
differentials, asset inequality and social norms.  If there is no intervention by the government, the 
inherent inequality will be fully reflected in the disposable income.  However, if the govemment 
wants to intewene -  as seems to be the case in the transition countries -it will find the second 
component of the %lirrlees model, the egalitarian objectives of the government.  And if the 
government tries to redistribute income from high-income people to low-income people, there 
will be incentive and disincentive effects. In other words the redistribution policy is the product 
of circumstances and objectives. Finally, the biinlees model has a revenue requirement from the 
tax'transfer sj-stem, to finance an exogenously given level of public goods.  In this framework, 
we use numerical si~nulations  to study questions such as how optimal redistribution might 
respond when inherent inequality increases, the government becomes less averse to inequality 
and the role of non-tax revenue decreases.' 
It is useful to lay out the basic model, even though it is well known.  There is a continuum of 
individuals, each having the same preference ordering, which is represented by an additive utility 
Il~nction  ir = i,,.(.r) -  C'O )  dcfincd  over consuinption x and hours worked l, with L'; :,  0 and V: .I 0 (subscripts indicating partial derivatives) and where V(.)  is convex.  Workers differ only in the pre- 
tax wage w they can earn. There is a distribution of w on the interval (s,h) represented by the 
density function f(w).Gross income  y = wl. 
Suppose that the am  of pollcy can be expressed as tnaxim171ng  the folloumg soclal welfare 
criterion 
where W(.) is an increasing and concave function of utility.  The govenlment cannot observe 
individuals' productivities and thus is restricted to setting taxes and transfers as a function only of 
earnings, T[y(n)].  The government maximizes S subject to the re%-enue  constraint 
where in the %firrlees tradition R is interpreted as the required revenue for essential public goods. 
The more non-tax revenue a government receives from external sources (as in the old fiscal system 
from state owned firms), the lower is R.  In addition to the revenue constraint, the government faces 
incentive compatibility constraints. These in turn state that each n individual maximizes utility by 
choice of hour.  Totally differentiating utility with respect to w, and makmg use of workers utility 
maximization condition, we obtain the incentive compatibility constraints, 
-  i licsc qtizstioris :veii. ciamincd b> Nea.by  (199:)  in  the fri~ine~~oik  of opiiirial  iinc:~i  tax,?tion. 
rhc !.order ccndition of individual's  opii~~iisaiion  piobiem is on!!  1  necessary condition for the individual's choice 
to b:.  optiinal. hut we assume hcrc rhat it is sufficient :IS iiell .Ass~irriptions  that ;isstire suiRicicnc) a:.e  prioiided 
.!s  f  I.  lotc  aiso th:it  \r!iilc  wc here picstinre 317  iiiternai solutii?n ioi I.  1121 re~nains  valid zvcn if. 
individiials were hiiiiched at 1.0  sincc. for them. dii d%.\ 0 Since T = cvi-x, we can think of govemmerlt as choosing schedules i(w) and x(w-). In fact it 
is easier to think of it choosing a pair of hctions, u(~)  and l(w), which maximize welfare index 
(10) subject to the incentive compatibility condition (12) and the revenue requirement  (1 I). 
Omitting details (for an exposition see Tuomala ,  1990), the first order conditions of this problem 
imply a pattem of marginal rates,%(z) = T8(z),  satiseing 
f  -- -  (e'  + l)U,,~t(~)ihi,f'(~) 
I-t 
where h is the multiplier on the revenue constraint and 
,~t(w?  =  J((WIV~  -  A)(s/L~,~  jf(p?cip. 
is the multiplier on the incentive compatibility constraint. This latter satisfies the transversality 
conditions. 
Finally, as in Atkinson-Stiglitz (1980) e = V'i  1V".  It is the elasticity of labour supply with 
respect to net wage, holding marginal utility of income constant, i.e. e is "compensated" wage 
elasticity in a rather unusual sense. 
Unfortltnately, how-ever, as is well recognized in the non-linear taxation literature, closed 
fonn analytical results are few and far between.5 It should be clear from (13) that the variation of 
"here  are other works that have looked at alternative derivations and formulae for non-linear taxation, scc Revcsz 
(I  Y89), Roberts (2000) and Saez (2001). 
Equations (13) - (15) lead to the feu  qualiiati\'c conclusions available in this fr;ril:eivoik  (seeruomela. 1990). It can he 
shown that the marginal tax rate on income is nonnegative.  This is more striking than it at first looks. It may vey  \+ell 
bc opti~nal  to haie the average t~x  rate less than zero, hut it is never optimal to subsidize earnings at margin.  ,An 
intuition is that it is cheaper to get people to gi\en indiffcrcnce curve by reducing average rate rather thiin by 
axacerbatingdeadweigh~  loss through distorting tlicir laboiir supply decisions.  It csn also be shoivn that the margin:>l ton 
rate is less than one. We also have the fantotis "end poiiir" rcsults.  If wngc distribuiion is bounded above. then the 
in2irgln:ii tax xiies at the top is rero  ifit is optiinal for lcast able indirid~al  to work tl~eii  the marginal Lax  ra:e  an least 
able is zero. :\r  intuition bchind :hcse endpoint i-esiilis is that only reason to haie a n:rginai  tax rate iiiffcring fioni rero 
!s to raise an :i\crage tan rate :~bove  illat point and loo-cr it beiorr  ie.  eijiii:y considci;itions.  Bur at thc top is 1x0  onc to 
take *om  and nt thz botton? ihel-i: is no one to giic  to. So iit the end points only efficiency consiiici:itions  :natter. 
l'iirncrical  soIi;tions iTuomal;i, l'ic)O)  h;!ic  iho\x.n.  !IUM-.\CI.  tllat t!~ese  reii!lts have iery litt!~  priictii:il  i-:levance. the optimal marginal tax rate with the level of income is a complex matter, and that comparative 
statics of inequality and averages as parameters vary will not be available in closed form.  This 
is a general feature on the optimal nonlinear income taxation literature (see Tuomala, 1990) 
where. following the lead of Minlees (1971) numerical calculations have proved useful in 
generating useful results'.  We follou this route here.  With these techniques, we can compute 
post tax income at each level of w, and thus calculate inequality of pre and post tax income as 
well as total income, for different values of key parameters.  Our focus is on identi&ing the 
combined effects of greater inherent inequality (the standard deviation of w), smaller inequality 
aversion and larger tax revenue requirement. We turn now to this task. 
We assume w to be distributed lognormally with parameters m and o  (see Aitchison and 
Brown, 1957). This assumption is common in the literature, following Minlees (1971).  For 
nu~nerical  simulations we choose o  = 0.39, 0.7 and 1 as a standard deviation of w and mean w  = 
0.4."  The calculations were carried out for both the CES and CD utility functions 
~  ~~~~~ 
Properties of the solution for this case were studied by Ueymark (1986j  for the discrete case and Eben (1992) for 
the continuous case. Roadway el al12000) provide a full characterization of the solution when preferences are quasi- 
linear in leisure. Diamond (1998) in turn shows that when preferences are quasi-linear in consumption, an explicit 
expression for the marginal rate can be derived in terms of the distribution of ability, the elasticity of the labour 
supply and the form of the social welfare function.  He finds the marginal tax rate schedule to be u-shaped in his 
example.  Dahan and Strawczynski (2000) clarifies this result showing that a rising marginal rates at high incomes 
depend on theioint 3ssumptions of an unbounded distribittion and quasi-linear preferences. 
Tuomriia (1990) gives dctails of the cumputatioiial procedure. 
"4.:  in Kanbur-Tuomala i  1994) we also try to calibrate the !ognorma! distribution so  that the income clictribution 
~nfiei-rcd  from the ability distribution iilatchcs the 3ctuai one. Ofcoursc it uiiuld be iinporiant to soI\e margin31 tax 
rate fcrmul:~  using the cmpiric;il earnings distribution. This is not possible to make directly bec;iusc the earnings 
iiistribution is afi;:cted  by thc tax scheduie itself  Sacz (2001  )makes  33 important innointion in this cjuestion.  lie 
c:ilibraies the ability distribiitirn so that givcn tiic utiiiry f~inctioii  cl>oscn  and the actii;il tar schedule tile resulting 
pre t3x distrib~~tion  rep1ic;ites the empiricnl earnings distrihii!ioii. where the elasticity of substihttion between consumption and leisure, denoted by E, is 0.5 for CES 
and 1 for CD. The social welfare function of the recipient government is specified9  as 
1  -,,,  W(u)  = --e  so that I3  measures the degree of inequality aversion in the social welfare 
P 
function of the govemnent (in the case of I3  = 0, we define 1%'  = u). R is specified as a fraction of 
national income, and is assumed to vary between -0.1 and 0.1. 
Table 4.1 ("the old fiscal system") 
&=0.5 6=l  o=.39 
F(w)  R=-. 1  R=0.0 
x  z MTR  x  z  MTR 
Yo  oio 
0.10  0.17  0.09  62  0.16  0.10  65 
0.50  0.20  0.18  56  0. 19  0.19  59 
0.90  0.27  0.32  45  0.26  0.33  47 
0.99  0.38  0.49  28  0.36  0.50  29 
RD  0.55  0.51 
Decile ratio  1.59  3.5  1.63  3.3 
(P90,'PlO) 
RD :the  cxtent of redistribution measured as the proportional reduction between the decile ratio for market 
income, 2, and the decile ratio for disposabic income, x. 
" For iiirrhcr discussion on :lie :m:iiforin:ilron  o!cac!i  Lrtdix idii:ii's  ~it~lit:;  see 'iuom:ila  !  1990). 
13 Table 4.2 f"The old fiscal system") 
R=l  0=.39 
F(w)  R=-.l  R=O.O 
x  z  MTR  x  z  n27R 
v;  Yo 
0.10  0.1 1  0.08  30  0.10  0.07  33 
0.50  0.17  0.15  28  0.15  0.15  30 
0.90  0.27  0.28  24  0.25  0.28  25 
0.99  0.41  0.44  20  0.38  0.45  18 
RD  0.3 1  0.37 
Decile ratio  2.48  3.58  2.50  3.97 
(P90:'PlO) 
Table 4.3  ("The new fiscal system") 
&=0.5 R=O  0-0.7 
F(w)  R=-. I  R=O.O  R=. 1 
X  z  MTR  x  z  MTR  x  z  MTR 
?6  0'  ,. 0  96 
0.10  0.17  0.06  55  0.16  0.06  56  0.15  0.10  60 
0.50  0.21  0.17  59  0.20  0.17  60  0.18  0.19  63 
0.90  0.33  0.43  56  0.31  0.45  57  0.24  0.34  60 
0.99  0.54  0.86  47  0.54  0.91  45  0.34  0.51  37 
RD  0.73  0.74  0.68 
Defile ratio  1.94  7.23  1.94  7.56  1.61  5.06 
IP90:Ploj Table 4.4 ("The new fiscal system") 
e=0.5  I3 = 0  o=1.0 
F(n)  R=0.0  R=. l 
x  z  MTR  x  z  MI7I 
oh  042 
0.10  0.17  0.02  55  0.16  0.02  59 
0.50  0.21  0.14  68  0.20  0.15  7  1 
0.90  0.35  0.55  71  0.33  0.61  72 
0.?9  0.70  1.61  58  0.67  1.65  59 
RD  0.92  0.93 
Decile ratio  2.06  27.5  2.06  30.1 
(P90lP 10) 
Table 4.5 ("The  new fiscal system") 
~=l  a-0.7 
F(n)  R=-.  1  R=O.O  R-0.1 
x  2  WR  x  z  MR  x  z  ?IITR 
"0  O/o  "41 
0.10  0.09  0.01  34  0.08  0.02  37  0.07  0.03  40 
0.50  0.16  0.12  38  0.15  0.13  40  0.14  0.13  42 
0.90  0.32  0.39  37  0.31  0.40  37  0.30  0.41  39 
0.99  0.64  0.88  33  0.64  0.89  30  0.63  0.92  30 
RD  0.91  0.81  0.68 
Defile ratio  3.57  39.15  3.90  20.1 1  4.30  13.65 
(P90 PI 0) Table 4.6 ("The new fiscal system") 
E = 1  8=  0  o=0.5 
F(n)  R-0.0 
X  z  MTR 
c!/o 
0.10  0.09  0.06  30 
0.50  0.15  0.15  29 
0.90  0.24  0.32  26 
0.99  0.47  0.57  22 
KD  0.45 
Decile ratio  2.9  5.3 
(P9OlP 10) 
Tables 4.1-4.6  give net income, gross income and optimal marginal tax rates at various 
percentiles of the ability distribution including the point at which the highest marginal tax rate 
occurs."  Tables 4.1 and 4.2 reflect "the old fiscal system" and Tables 4.3,4.5-4.6 in tum "the new 
one".  Those results are for the two degrees of inequality (I$ = 1 and I3 = O),  assuming  E -  0.5 or 1, o 
=0.39,=0.5 =0.7  ,=1.0,andRZ-0.1,O.OandO.l. 
Consider first the progressivity of the tax stnlcture as a function of revenue requiremnent. 
Tables 4.1-4.6 show that optimal taxtransfer systems become more progressive  hen inequality 
increases, o = 0.5 ,  cr = 0.7 and o =1.0, and when R becomes more negative (i.e. more non tax 
revenue).  To understand this, we can combine the results of two earlier studies. Kanbur- 
Tuomala (1 994) show that with greater market income "inherent"  inequality optimal marginal 
tax rates increase with income over the majority of the population.  On the other hand we know 
fsoin Immonen-Kanbur-Keen-Tuomala  (I  998) that as the revenue requirement bccomes negative 
''  \V,!b  the :o!liiy  fiirction ;re  use, ihcic is .'b:inching"aIl  tiioie bi.lo~>:  2:  csi:ical  v:iioc  ofn choosc no:  :o  *ioik, 
Thcir p:;  ilx  inci:;iie is thus zero and !h&i  post trin  iiicom? is whatcrci- tlic nptil-??! t:~  ai;il  transfer i-csiiiic gives 
!hem so that for example non-tax revenue is available the minimunl income requirement for the poor 
can be tnet without clawing back revenue with a high marginal tax rate.  Thus we have low 
marginal tax rates on the poor.  In other words, optimal progressivity, taking into account 
incentive effects, increases with higher inherent inequality and with non-tax revenue.  Thus, 
while the increasing inherent inequality would have induced a paaially correcting "optimat" 
increase in progressivity of the tadtransfer system, the decrease in non-tax revenue (and hence 
increase in the revenue requirement from the tax system) that was also seen in the transition 
would have been a force for decreasing progressivity. 
In Tables 4.1-4.6 we see what happens when the government becomes less averse to 
inequality, inherent inequality increases and the revenue requirement also increases.  The extent of 
optimat redistribution measured as difference in the decile ratio betvieen gross income, z, and net 
income, x, increases as a consequence of increasing the wage dispersion.  This is just what we can 
see in those transition countries having at least two observations (see Table 4.2).  On the other hand 
the pattern of marginal tax rates is quite different. With parameters (E = 0.5,o = 0.7, B = 0, R = 0.0,) 
the marginal tax rate increases with income up to the 74%; with E=  1  .O, on the other hand, it 
increases with income up to 69%.  An interesting question is when might an increase in inherent 
inequality, an increase in the tax revenue requirement, and a decrease in inequality aversion, be 
roughly offsetting'?  We see in Tables 4.2 and 4.6 that in terns of marginal tax rate strucnue the 
effect of increasing the wage dispersion from  o = 0.39  to o = 0.5 is the same as moving from R = I 
to R = 0. If the decile ratio for net income is the criterion then the cases ( E = 0.5, B = 1,o  = 0.39, R 
=-0.1),(~=0.5,B=l,o=0.39,R=0.0)and(t:=0.5,B=O~o=0.7,R=O.1)  areroughly 
speaking the same. Thus given this criterion the effect of increasing the inherent inequality from o = 
0.39 too  = 0.7: and increasing tax revenue requirctnent kotn R = 0.0 to R -  0.1 is the same as 
moving from  B -  1 to 0  = 0. 
5.  Conclusions 
In  this paper we argue that at!  analysis of the evolution of pre and post tax income 
inequality in the transitioil econon~ics  of Central and Eastern Europc can be structured. and the 
different forces in  play understood, through the framework of optimal income taxation.  Using the simple two-type and two-sector optimal income tax model we first of all show that a decrease 
in public provision of public goods may have been an important factor in explaining increasing 
pre-tax ("inherent")  inequality in transition economies during the 1990s. We also ask, in the 
framework of non-linear optimal tax theory, how redistribution might respond when inherent 
inequality increases, the government becomes less averse to inequality and the role of non-tax 
revenue decreases, all of which happened during transition. We use numerical simulations to study 
these questions.  We discuss when these forces are offsetting and when they reinforce each other as 
governments choose tadtransfer schedules optimally in response to them. in trying to understand 
the stylised facts of pre and post tax income inequality during transition.  While the increase in 
inherent inequality induces a response of greater progressivity, this is counteracted by the tendency 
of the other two forces to decrease progressivity. Overall "optimal" progressivity thus increases, but 
not sufficiently to overcome the increase in inherent inequality, which leads to an increasing post 
tax inequality.  And these are precisely the stylised facts of inequality and progressivity during 
transition that we set out to investigate. References 
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